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estimated population of 1,355,692,576, only
owns 9,569,901 sq. Km. of land73; this is
compared to the United States’ 9,161,966 sq.
Km. and 318,892,103 population.74 Oliver De
Schutter, a Human Rights Council food expert
for the United Nations, believes that food
security difficulties are probable for China,
citing the decrease in arable land, urbanization
and rising food prices as the causes.75
To minimize the possibility of a food
security crisis and a natural resource shortage,
the Chinese government is purchasing rights to
land in various strategic areas throughout the
world. Land acquisitions include mineral mines
in Afghanistan and Burma, farmlands in
Argentina and Africa, and oil fields in
Kazakhstan. Fears of a food security crisis are
abundant in areas where the population
outgrows the land’s ability to produce
sustainable food sources, due to the effects of
desertification and urbanization. The Gobi
Desert is expanding into what were once the
grasslands of northern China, creating
desertification. A large population migration
from rural areas to urban centers has
increased the need for processed foods, but
decreased the land able to produce due to
increased desertification. China’s economy is
also driven primarily by the large technology
industry that has made it the world’s leader in
production. The occurrences outlined above
are leading incentives for China to acquire
control of resource-rich lands outside of their
borders.
Chinese land acquisitions focused on
mineral mining are concentrated in Afghanistan
and Burma. Within Afghanistan, China’s stateowned company, China Metallurgical Group
Corporation (MCC), signed a $2.9 billion deal
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Over the past decade, the government of
China has been acquiring sectors of land in
strategically significant areas around the world
in order to guarantee a foothold in both natural
resource commodities and national food
security.
China’s population has grown to 1,349,585,838
(July 2013 est.),66 making it the most populous
country in the world. With a population growth
rate of 0.46%, China’s population is growing by
6,208,094 individuals each year.67 Available
natural resources within China’s borders are
stressed to the limits, and do not fulfill the
needs of the Chinese people. A significant
population increase affects oil imports as well.
China produces 8.992 million barrels of refined
petroleum products per day,68 while the
consumption rate reaches 9.79 million barrels
per day.69 This creates a continuously growing
need for refined petroleum imports. Crude oil
import levels are at 5.422 million barrels per
day, making China the third highest oil importer
in the world.70
The need for resources also leads
China to address its status of agriculture. China
has significantly less cultivable land than the
United States, 11.62% compared to the U.S.
16.29% in arable land.71 Though the U.S. has
more farmable land, it has approximately 75%
less of a population to feed.72 China, with an
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with the Afghani government to “extract copper
from…one of the world’s largest unexploited
copper deposits.”76 This deposit is estimated to
contain 240 million tons of copper ore.77 The
Chinese federal government owns 44% of
MCC, allowing it to benefit greatly from the
copper ore deal.78 In Burma, the Letpadaung
copper mine, Burma’s largest, is the focus of
Chinese resource operations.79 Letpadaung is
run by a company linked to the Chinese military
“in cooperation with the largest Burmese
military-owned company,” Union of Myanmar
Economic
Holdings
Company
Limited
(UMEHL).80 China also invested in the
Myitsone hydropower dam in Kachin state,
operated by the China Power Investment
Corporation.81
However,
the
Burmese
President suspended this project in 2011 after
civil society groups protested its impact on the
area, which caused “immeasurable” financial
losses to the company.82 Chinese mining
operations abroad have taken advantage of
massive copper deposits, creating a useful
source for the metal to be mined for decades to
come.
The Chinese government’s top priority
is securing access to oil fields and
transportation avenues from Central Asia to the
Middle East, due to rising needs for crude oil
and natural gas imports. New deals with
Russia, acquiring strategic pipelines in
Kazakhstan, exploiting natural gas in Burma,
and gaining control of a port in southern
Pakistan are the most significant steps China is
taking to ensure control of sufficient quantities
of oil and natural gas. Russia is currently

preparing to sign a new set of agreements with
China
regarding
energy
resources.83
Specifically, the contracts would enable greater
purchases of natural gas from Russia and
mutual development of nuclear power
production projects that would benefit both
states.84
In
the
resource-rich
state
of
Kazakhstan, China holds a “50-100% stake in
15 companies working in Kazakhstan’s energy
sector.”85 The Chinese government is also
purchasing existing energy companies that are
already established in the area, as exemplified
by the $2.6 billion acquisition of Kazakh oil
producer MangistauMunaiGaz by the China
National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC).86
Similarly, the China Investment Corporation
spent $939 million for 11% of the
KazMunaiGaz Exploration and Production
Company.87 Agreements between the two
governments include the development of joint
uranium production projects and expanding the
partially CNPC-owned, Kazakh-China oil
pipeline by 762 kilometers. The pipeline
currently stretches from the Caspian Sea to
China’s Xinjiang province.88
China’s pursuit for natural gas reaches
into Burma’s reserves as well. A 30-year deal
signed in December of 2008 between Burma’s
military government and the People’s Republic
enables the pumping of natural gas from fields
off of Burma’s northwestern coast into southern
China.89 This deal will allow China to pipe gas
from reserves off the coast of Burmese state
Rahkine to supply China’s National United Oil
Corporation.90
In Pakistan, China is taking a different
approach to establish control over natural
resources.
The
Pakistani
government

76

Charles Wallace, “China, Not U.S., Likely to Benefit
from Afghanistan’s Mineral Riches,” Daily Finance, June
14, 2010. http://www.dailyfinance.com/2010/06/14/chinaus-afghanistan-mineral-mining/ (February 13, 2013).
77
Ibid.
78
Ibid.
79
Daniel Schearf, “Burma Authorities Accused of Fraud,
Coercion at China-Backed Mine,” Voice of America,
February 14, 2013.
http://www.voanews.com/content/Burma-authorities-usedcoercion-at-china-backed-mine/1603549.html (February
16. 2013).
80
Ibid.
81
“Burma ‘Latest Flashpoint’ in Global Land Grabbing
Epidemic,” Democratic Voice of Burma, Global Policy
Forum, February 11, 2013.
http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/217
-hunger/52258-burma-latest-flashpoint-in-global-landgrabbing-epidemic.html (February 12, 2013).
82
Ibid.

83

“Russia looks to new set of agreements with China –
official,” Voice of Russia, Turkish Weekly, February 25,
2013. http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/147522/
(February 11, 2013).
84
Ibid.
85
Rayhan Demytrie, “Struggle for Central Asian energy
riches,” BBC News, Almaty, June 3, 2010.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10175847 (February 12,
2013).
86
Ibid.
87
Ibid.
88
Demytrie, “Struggle for Central Asian energy riches.”
89
“Firms to pipe Burma gas to China,” BBC News,
December 29, 2008. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asiapacific/7802713.stm (February 13, 2013).
90
Ibid.

15

transposed
operational
control
of
an
advantageously placed deep-water port in
Gwadar over to China.91 Gwadar is located on
the coast of the Arabian Sea in Pakistan’s
Balochistan province, only 180 nautical miles
from the Strait of Hormuz.92 Chinese control of
the port in Gwadar is seen as “the westernmost
link in the ‘string of pearls’” 93 strategy
employed by China to expand the range of the
Chinese Navy. Control of this port also creates
an extremely important connection of Middle
Eastern oil exports to Chinese markets.
Chinese endeavors for oil and natural gas
acquisition are no longer centrally focused on
Central Asia, as illustrated by the transfer of
power in Gwadar.
The significance of food security in
China is growing continuously as well. In order
to cultivate enough food to sustain the
6,208,094 new Chinese citizens each year, the
government has purchased land in Argentina,
the Philippines, Africa, and Kazakhstan. The
action of buying agricultural land and sending
workers to cultivate the land is known as
China’s “go-out policy.”94 In Argentina, near the
Patagonia region, the Chinese state-owned
company Beidahuang has signed an
agreement with the government of the Rio
Negro province to acquire 790,000 acres of
private farmland.95 The same company also
purchased 494,000 acres in the Philippines for
the Chinese government.96 Land purchases are
primarily
made
by
government-linked
businesses such as Beidahuang.
China is acquiring land in other regions
as well, including Sub-Saharan Africa and
Kazakhstan. Although China is not purchasing

as much land in Africa as the governments of
South Korea, India, the U.S., or Arab nations,
roughly a million Chinese farmers have
relocated to Africa to cultivate land for their
nation.97 In the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, China purchased about 7 million acres
for a biofuel palm plantation.98 This is the
largest and most significant acquisition of land
in Africa made by the Chinese. In Central Asia,
the state of Kazakhstan is not only making
deals with the Chinese to expand their oil and
natural gas relations, but also developing a
relationship over land control bonds. These
bonds created by Kazakhstan allow Chinese
businesses to rent roughly 250 million acres of
land. This enables the Chinese businesses to
grow much-needed crops with a relatively short
distance to travel overland into China.99 Food
grown in these areas will be utilized not only to
feed Chinese citizens but also to develop
biofuel technology, raise livestock, and develop
agriculture transportation capabilities.
The effects of Chinese land acquisitions
reach far beyond the simple goal of China
accruing a greater quantity of agriculture and
oil. It results in developed relationships with
foreign governments, a changed outlook on the
Chinese from foreign citizens, and the
consequences of a distant government owning
the resources that are needed by local citizens.
By signing contracts and deals with states such
as Kazakhstan, Russia, Burma, and Pakistan,
China is building bridges with the governments
of these states. This developing bond could
lead to further partnership in other endeavors,
possibly even an alliance in future combat
operations. This would be a difficult hurdle for
the United States and other western
governments if conflict ever were to arise in
Central Asia. Whether or not potential conflicts
arise, these loose alliances could make dealing
with China and these other nations very difficult
in the future. One aspect of these relationships
that could benefit the West is that Chinese land
acquisitions, especially in Kazakhstan and
Argentina, seem to have incensed the local
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populaces.
Public
demonstrations
in
Kazakhstan protested Chinese involvement in
their country; banners stated, “Kazakh land is
not for sale.”100 In Argentina, environmental
groups and constitutional experts do not wish
to see Chinese control of Argentinian lands;
one lawyer, Eduardo Barcesat, states “We
need our own people to eat well first, and after
that we can feed the rest of the world…” 101
Citizens of these nations might be influenced to
accept greater trade with the West as an
alternative to Chinese land acquisitions.
Governments have accepted Chinese
land purchases across the globe, but private
citizens have opposed the acquisitions.
Although many individuals are against their
involvement, China will continue to acquire
control of strategic land throughout the world in
order to guarantee their food security and
ensure the natural resource needs of their
nation are met. Recent land purchases, control
of strategic areas, and long-term developments
built in resource-rich states by China confirm
that they are indeed ensuring their strong
foothold in natural resource commodities and
protection against a food security crisis.
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